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Testing Applicants with Disabilities
Abstract

All jurisdictions provide reasonableaccommodations for applicants with disabilities who are otherwise
qualified to sit for the bar examination. The provision of accommodations is primarily a result of the
comprehensive federal law known as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), passed by Congress in
1990 to prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities. The ADA protects both applicants with
physical disabilities and those with mental disabilities, and accommodations include not only additional
testing time, longer and more frequent breaks between testing sessions, and private testing rooms, but also
other auxiliary aids and services designed to enable effective communication to and from bar examination
applicants.
Prior to the adoption of the ADA in 1990, jurisdictions provided accommodations primarily to applicants
with physical disabilities, including visual and motor impairments. While applicants have continued to
request accommodations for physical disabilities under the ADA, the more challenging cases for bar
examiners arise when applicants claim they have mental impairments, as those impairments are not always
easily diagnosed or documented. A more detailed discussion of how the ADA affects testing accommodations
for bar examination applicants follows, with recommendations as to how bar examiners should address
requests for accommodations from applicants with disabilities.
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TESTING APPLICANTS
WITH DISABILITIES
by Stuart Duhl and Gregory M. Duhl

A

ll jurisdictions provide reasonable

challenging cases for bar examiners arise when

accommodations for applicants with

applicants claim they have mental impairments, as

disabilities who are otherwise quali-

those impairments are not always easily diagnosed

fied to sit for the bar examination. The

or documented. A more detailed discussion of how

provision of accommodations is primarily a result of

the ADA affects testing accommodations for bar
examination applicants follows,

the comprehensive federal law
known as the Americans with

WHILE

Disabilities Act (“the ADA”),

TINUED TO REQUEST ACCOMMO-

passed by Congress in 1990 to
prohibit discrimination against
persons with disabilities. The
ADA protects both applicants

APPLICANTS HAVE CON-

DATIONS FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA, THE MORE

with recommendations as to
how

bar

examiners

should

address requests for accommodations from applicants with disabilities.

CHALLENGING CASES FOR BAR

with physical disabilities and

EXAMINERS ARISE WHEN APPLI-

INTRODUCTION1

those with mental disabilities,

CANTS CLAIM THEY HAVE MENTAL

The Americans with Disabilities

and accommodations include

IMPAIRMENTS, AS THOSE IMPAIR-

Act (ADA)2 is the most compre-

not only additional testing time,

MENTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY

hensive piece of civil rights legis-

longer and more frequent breaks

DIAGNOSED OR DOCUMENTED.

lation prohibiting discrimination

between testing sessions, and
private testing rooms, but also

against persons with disabilities.
The ADA consists of Title I,

other auxiliary aids and services designed to enable

which prohibits discrimination in employment; Title

effective communication to and from bar examination

II, which prohibits discrimination by public entities;

applicants.

and Title III, which prohibits discrimination in pub-

Prior to the adoption of the ADA in 1990, juris-

lic accommodations by private entities. Unlike its

dictions provided accommodations primarily to

predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,3 the ADA

applicants with physical disabilities, including

covers public entities that do not receive federal

visual and motor impairments. While applicants

funding, including boards of bar examiners. Since

have continued to request accommodations for

taking effect on July 26, 1992, the ADA and its relat-

physical disabilities under the ADA, the more

ed regulations have provided bar examiners with an
infrastructure for administering examinations to
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applicants with disabilities, as well as for conducting

Because boards of bar examiners receive their

non-discriminatory character and fitness investiga-

authority from state supreme courts and state consti-

tions.

tutions, they are “government agencies” and there-

4

Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
denying disabled persons access to or participation

Despite the view of some federal district courts12

in services or programs run or sponsored by such

and at least two United States Supreme Court jus-

entities. The statute defines public entities as

tices (Justices Scalia and Thomas)13 that boards of bar

“instrumentalities of a State”;6 these entities include

examiners fall within the scope of Title III, the leg-

boards of bar examiners, which are delegated

islative history of the ADA suggests that Congress

authority over bar admissions by state supreme

intended for Title III to protect against discrimina-

courts in accordance with individual state statutes

tion in public accommodations by all groups not

5

and constitutions. All courts that

covered under Title II.14 If that

have addressed the question of

interpretation is correct, Title III

whether Title II covers state

IN

boards of bar examiners have

REQUIRES BAR EXAMINERS TO

examiners because they are cov-

found it applicable. No state

EXTEND

“REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS” TO APPLICANTS

ered by Title II. Until it is

WITH DISABILITIES SO AS TO LEVEL

bar examiners, obligatory com-

7

board has ever challenged the
applicability of Title II to its
administrative functions.
The applicability of Title III

PRACTICE,

THE

ADA

THE PLAYING FIELD RELATIVE TO
NON-DISABLED

APPLICANTS,

is less clear. Section 12189 of

WITHOUT

Title III states that “any person

WITH DISABILITIES AN UNFAIR

that offers examinations . . .
related to . . . licensing . . . for

GIVING

APPLICANTS

ADVANTAGE.

does not cover boards of bar

resolved whether Title III covers
pliance with Title III most likely
rests with the facilities where
applicants take the bar exam,
such as hotels that provide space
for administering the examination, and not with bar examiners
themselves.15 Therefore, the focus

professional purposes shall offer
such examinations . . . in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or [offer] alternative
accessible arrangements [to] such individuals.”8
Congress intended for Title III to regulate “private
entities” (which would exclude state boards of bar

of the analysis in this article will be on Title II, but
there is likely no material difference between a bar
examination applicant’s substantive rights under
Titles II and III, if both are found to cover state boards
of bar examiners.

examiners),9 and the U.S. Department of Justice regu-

In practice, the ADA requires bar examiners to

lations promulgated under § 12189 appear to apply

extend “reasonable accommodations” to applicants

only to private entities that administer examinations.

10

with disabilities so as to level the playing field rela-

However, § 12189 also refers to “any person that

tive to non-disabled applicants, without giving

offers examinations,” and defines “any person” as

applicants with disabilities an unfair advantage. The

including “government and government agencies.”

ADA also prohibits bar examiners, when conducting

11

8

fore “persons” under the ADA.
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character and fitness investigations, from consider-

The law covers physical disabilities, including (i)

ing any aspect of an applicant’s character unrelated

“[p]hysiological disorder[s] or condition[s]” (e.g.,

to the applicant’s fitness to practice law.

blindness, deafness); (ii) “[c]osmetic disfigurement”;

This article analyzes the infrastructure of Title II
of the ADA and discusses its implications for bar
examiners. Part 1 defines the statute’s critical terms,
while Part 2 describes how courts have applied those
terms to bar examination applicants who require
testing accommodations. Part 3 contains a discussion
of some ADA-related constitutional and procedural
issues raised in litigation between bar examination
applicants with disabilities and boards of bar examiners. Part 4 consists of practical suggestions for bar
examiners wishing to comply with the ADA when
deciding on requests for testing accommodations
from applicants with disabilities. Last, Part 5 discusses some limitations that the ADA places on bar

and (iii) “[a]natomical loss” (e.g., loss of an eye, paraplegia);17 and mental disabilities, including “mental
or psychological disorder[s] such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities” (e.g.,
autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
schizophrenia, dyslexia).18 Interestingly, the law protects even those applicants who have been misdiagnosed as disabled (if diagnostic records exist), as well
as applicants who have overcome their disabilities.
In all cases, bar examination applicants who file
ADA-based lawsuits against state boards of bar
examiners must prove the existence of a “disability”
requiring the requested accommodation(s).19

examiners in their character and fitness evaluations

The critical task for bar examiners is to evaluate

of applicants, although this is an area of the law that

an applicant’s impairment in light of all available

is not fully developed.

mitigating or corrective measures, including artificial
mitigating measures (e.g., medicines and mechanical

PART 1: DEFINITIONS

devices such as ritalin, insulin, glasses, and hearing

According to the ADA, any bar examination appli-

aids) and natural measures available to all applicants

cant with a disability who is otherwise qualified to

(e.g., extra study, additional sleep, relaxation exer-

sit for a state bar examination has the right to rea-

cises, diet). Bar examiners can find some guidance

sonable accommodations when taking the exam. It is

from McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of

therefore necessary to understand the statute’s defi-

Medicine,20 a case in which the United States Court of

nitions of “disability,” “otherwise qualified,” and

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that test anxi-

“reasonable accommodations.”

ety is not a “disability” under the ADA when it is
possible to counteract the symptoms with additional

Disability

studying.

The ADA defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.

16

The United States Supreme Court expanded on
the principle outlined in McGuinness in three companion cases, essentially ruling that lower courts
cannot categorically evaluate impairments in their
uncorrected states.21 In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
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the airline refused to hire two twin sisters as pilots

working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’

because they each had uncorrected vision of 20/200

requires . . . that plaintiffs allege that they are unable

or worse in the right eye and 20/400 or worse in the

to work in a broad class of jobs.”25 Similarly, bar

left eye—both below the company’s requirement of

examination applicants seeking testing accommoda-

uncorrected 20/100 vision or better in each eye. The

tions must prove that their impairments have sub-

Court ruled that the sisters did not have “impair-

stantially impeded or precluded them from perform-

ments” requiring protection under the ADA because

ing physical or mental tasks of central importance to

both had at least 20/20 vision in each eye with cor-

their daily lives, and not tasks that are tied only to

rective lenses. In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,22 the

taking the bar examination or practicing law.

Court found that a truck driver’s untreatable ambly-

Bar examiners and courts have also wrestled

opia (an eye disease resulting in monocular vision)

with the appropriate universe of comparison when

qualified as an “impairment” under the ADA.

deciding whether testing applicants have “disabili-

However, it also found that the impairment did not

ties.” In evaluating whether a bar examination appli-

“substantially limit” the driver in any “major life

cant’s impairment “substantially limits one or more

activity” because of the coping mechanisms that he

major life activities,” should a comparison be made

had developed in response to the disease.

with other applicants or to average persons in the

After deciding those cases, the United States
Supreme Court further narrowed the definition of
“disability” in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams.23 Diagnosed with several nerve disorders, including carpal tunnel syndrome, the plaintiff
in Toyota sued her employer, Toyota Motor

with a reading impairment might read quite slowly
in comparison to other applicants (thus qualifying as
“disabled”), but might nonetheless read quickly
compared to average persons in the general population (therefore not qualifying).

Manufacturing, under the ADA. She claimed that

The two federal circuit courts that have consid-

Toyota had required her to continue such manual

ered the relevant universe in testing accommoda-

tasks as inspecting, wiping, and adding oil to new

tions cases agree that when the “major life activity”

automobiles despite its knowledge of her impair-

in question is reading or learning, the applicant’s

ment. In ruling against the employee, the Court held

impairment should be measured against the average

that while her impairment interfered with the per-

person in the general population.26 However, those

formance of work-related manual tasks, it did not

courts gave conflicting rulings when the “major life

render her “unable to perform the variety of [manu-

activity” in question involved the workplace. In

al] tasks central to most people’s daily lives.”24 In that

Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,27 the

particular case, the Court refused to consider

United States Court of Appeals for the Second

whether the plaintiff’s impairment “substantially

Circuit compared an applicant’s learning impair-

limit[ed]” her capabilities in the “major life activity”

ment against persons having “comparable training,

of working. However, in Sutton v. United Airlines,

skills[] and ability” (e.g., other bar examination

Inc., the Court did consider that issue and noted that

applicants). But in Gonzales v. National Board of

“[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is

10

general population? A bar examination applicant
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Medical Examiners,28 the United States Court of

appellate court confused the issue of an applicant’s

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit compared an applicant

qualifications to sit for the bar examination with her

for a medical licensing examination to the average

qualifications for bar membership. In Clement v.

person in the general population. Bar examination

Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,32 an applicant with a

applicants arguing that they are “substantially limit-

learning disability failed the Virginia bar examina-

ed” in the “major life activity” of working will rely

tion six times, despite the fact that the board provid-

on Bartlett when litigating outside of the Sixth

ed her greater accommodations each time she sat for

Circuit, while bar examiners litigating outside of the

the exam. On her sixth and final attempt, the board

Second Circuit will use Gonzales for support. Most

permitted her to take the examination over four days

commentators who have considered the issue believe

instead of two, and to take three-hour rest breaks

that the average person in the general population is

between the morning and afternoon testing sessions

the appropriate measure for comparison, regardless

each day. After failing the exam for the sixth time, the

of which “major life activity” is involved.

applicant argued to the court that she should have

29

30

Otherwise Qualified
According to the ADA, a bar
examination applicant with a
“disability” should receive accommodations only if he or she

been permitted to take the exam-

MOST
HAVE

COMMENTATORS
CONSIDERED

BELIEVE

THAT

THE

THE

ination over seven days (four

ISSUE

days of testing with alternate

AVERAGE

PERSON IN THE GENERAL POPU-

is “otherwise qualified” to sit for

LATION

the bar examination. The ADA

MEASURE

applies to:

REGARDLESS OF WHICH

[a]n individual with a dis-

WHO

IS

THE
FOR

APPROPRIATE
COMPARISON,

“MAJOR

LIFE ACTIVITY” IS INVOLVED.

30

days of rest). In finding for the
Virginia board, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found that the applicant
failed to show that she was “otherwise qualified for Bar membership.” Under the ADA, the appli-

ability who, with or without

cant’s qualifications to join the

reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or

Virginia bar were not relevant.

practices, . . . or the provision of auxiliary

The appropriate question was whether she was “oth-

aids and services, meets the essential eligibil-

erwise qualified” to sit for the Virginia bar examina-

ity requirements for the receipt of services or

tion. The Fourth Circuit made a similar mistake in

the participation in programs or activities

interpreting the “otherwise qualified” requirement

provided by a public entity.31

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In Pandazides v.

Here the service or activity is taking the bar examination. An “otherwise qualified individual” is any
applicant who has a “disability” and has satisfied the
state board’s “essential eligibility requirements”
(e.g., is of the minimum age, holds a degree from an
accredited law school, has paid an exam fee) for taking the bar examination. In one instance, a federal

Virginia Board of Education,33 the court held that a
determination of whether an individual taking a
teaching certification examination was “otherwise
qualified” required, in part, a factual inquiry into
whether she could perform the “essential functions”
of a teacher.
The Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the “otherwise qualified” requirement in both Pandazides and
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Clement: nowhere does the ADA require that appli-

credible medical opinion.36 State boards may offer

cants for professional licensure examinations

alternative accommodations if accommodations are

demonstrate qualifications or abilities to practice

not requested out of necessity, and if the requested

their chosen professions. Applicants must only satis-

accommodations (i) impose too great a financial bur-

fy the criteria spelled out by state licensing boards

den; (ii) threaten the security of the bar examination;

for taking the licensing examination. Because states

or (iii) challenge the validity or fairness of the exam-

use the bar examination as one measure of whether

ination.37 When an applicant mounts a legal chal-

applicants are qualified to practice law, the only

lenge to alternative accommodations offered by a

ADA-related issues pertinent to bar examiners (aside

state board, the board must prove that the accommo-

from character and fitness) are whether applicants

dations requested by the applicant are unreason-

with disabilities are qualified to sit for the bar exam-

able.38 Thus, boards must carefully consider on a

ination, and, if so, whether they require reasonable

case-by-case basis how to accommodate individual

accommodations.

applicants in light of efficiency, cost, feasibility, and
test validity.

Reasonable Accommodations
According to the ADA, if applicants with disabilities are “otherwise qualified” to sit for the bar

CONSISTENT

that whenever a board fails to

LAW, BAR EXAMINERS SHOULD

use its own expert to evaluate an

“PRIMARY

CONSIDERATION”

applicant’s medical documenta-

ACCOMMODATIONS

tion, it must defer to any credible

accommodations” to avoid dis-

REQUESTED BY APPLICANTS WITH

opinion offered by the appli-

criminating against them. Such

DISABILITIES IF THE ACCOMMO-

accommodations include “rea-

DATIONS

sonable modifications in poli-

CREDIBLE MEDICAL OPINION.

examination, state boards must

GIVE

provide them with “reasonable

TO

cies, practices, or procedures

THE

ARE

when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination because of [a] disability” (e.g., additional breaks, separate testing room,
Braille print or the assistance of a reader, access to a
computer or a typewriter);34 reasonable accommodations also include increasing the length of time permitted for completing the examination.35
Understanding what constitutes “reasonable
accommodations” under the ADA requires guidance
from the courts. Consistent with recent case law, bar
examiners should give “primary consideration” to
the accommodations requested by applicants with
disabilities if the accommodations are supported by

12

Some courts have suggested
WITH RECENT CASE
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SUPPORTED
36

BY

cant’s

own

physician(s)

or

expert(s). In D’Amico v. New York
State Board of Law Examiners,39 the
New York board denied the
request of a bar examination

applicant with a visual disability to take the exam
over four days instead of two, but did give her extra
time within the two-day exam period. In finding for
the applicant, the New York federal district court
noted that the board had acted unreasonably in
denying the applicant her requested accommodations because it failed to obtain and offer any medical
evidence of its own to rebut the recommendations
offered by the applicant’s physician. Similarly, the
Delaware Supreme Court held in In re Petition of Kara
B. Rubenstein40 that the Delaware State Board of Bar
Examiners acted unfairly when it denied an applicant

certain accommodations recommended by her

section, but no additional time for the MBE. On her

physician because the board failed to support its

fourth attempt, the applicant passed the essay exam-

decision with clinical evidence of its own. Thus, it

ination but failed the MBE, and the board refused to

appears that bar examiners should retain their own

certify her for admission to the Delaware bar. She

medical experts for the purpose of evaluating accom-

filed a petition with the Delaware Supreme Court,

modation requests, especially when contemplating

asking the court to suspend the requirement that she

denying those requests.

pass both the MBE and essay section of the examina-

The ADA does not require bar examiners to
afford applicants accommodations that compromise
the validity or fairness of the bar examination. For
example, courts have yet to require that a state board
extend accommodations to an applicant if doing so
would make the applicant’s bar examination score
invalid and frustrate the examination’s objective of
measuring “minimal competence” to practice law. In
Florida Board of Law Examiners re: SG,41 an applicant
with attention deficit disorder who was given 25 percent extra time to complete the Florida bar examina-

tion during the same test administration. The court
ruled in the applicant’s favor, stating that the board
had (i) acted inconsistently in giving the applicant
extra time for the essay section but not for the MBE,
and (ii) failed to follow the National Conference of
Bar Examiners’ (NCBE) recommendation that applicants with learning disabilities presumptively
receive time and a half to take the bar examination.
The Delaware court accepted the applicant’s argument that she had not received the minimum accommodations mandated by the ADA.

tion asked the Florida Supreme Court to order the

Courts have made it clear through several rul-

Florida board to average her part A and part B scores

ings that applicants with disabilities must qualify to

from two different test administrations. The court

sit for the bar examination and pass it, with or with-

refused, expressing concern over the validity of the

out reasonable accommodations, “in spite of” their

applicant’s final examination score, and holding that

disabilities.43 In Anderson v. University of Wisconsin,44 a

the ADA “does not require modifications that would

case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

knowledge [that] the exam is intended to test.”

Circuit noted that the primary issue for a law school

However, at least one court—the Delaware
Supreme Court—has allowed an applicant to combine scores from two different test administrations.
The petitioner in In re Petition of Kara B. Rubenstein42
had failed the Delaware bar examination three times,
although she did receive a passing Multistate Bar
Examination (MBE) score on her third attempt. The

that had denied readmission to a student was not
whether the student could have maintained the
school’s minimum grade point average “but for” his
disability—in that case, alcoholism. The court ruled
in the university’s favor because the law studentplaintiff could not maintain the minimum grade
point average “in spite of” his disability.45

applicant discovered that she had a learning disabil-

Courts have also refused to require bar examiners

ity and applied to take the examination a fourth time

to reduce passing scores or waive bar examination

with accommodations, and the Delaware board allot-

requirements altogether for applicants with disabili-

ted her one hour extra for each three-hour essay

ties. According to the ADA Title II Technical Assistance
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13

Manual published by the U.S. Department of Justice’s

section—giving applicants with disabilities unlimit-

Office of Civil Rights, “A public entity does not have

ed time on that section would be unfair to the appli-

to lower or eliminate licensing standards that are

cants without disabilities. But in practice, it is very

essential to the licensed activity to accommodate an

difficult for bar examiners to determine where to

individual with a disability. Whether a specific

draw the line between leveling the playing field for

requirement is essential will depend on the facts of

applicants with disabilities and giving them an

the particular case.”

unfair advantage. As one commentator has noted,

46

bar examiners can never be certain that giving appli-

At least one federal district court has specifically

cants with disabilities extra time does not affect the

ruled that the ADA does not require a state to waive

validity of their bar examination scores.48

an objective licensure examination if an applicant
with a disability cannot pass it. In Jacobsen v.

PART 2: DISABILITIES AND
ACCOMMODATIONS

Tillmann,47 the dyslexic plaintiff could not pass the
Pre-Professional Skills Test (PPST) required of all

This section reviews how courts have applied the

teachers seeking licensure in Minnesota, even with

ADA to bar examination applicants seeking testing

“reasonable accommodations.”
In denying her request that the

accommodations for different

Minnesota Board of Teaching be

COURTS

ordered to grant her a teaching

TO REQUIRE BAR EXAMINERS TO

license, the Minnesota federal

REDUCE PASSING SCORES OR WAIVE

district court offered the analogy

BAR EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS

of a law school graduate who
could not pass the bar examination. In both situations, the court

HAVE ALSO

ALTOGETHER

APPLICANTS

WITH DISABILITIES.

said that a state could require
the objective evaluation of an applicant’s competence to practice his or her profession as a prerequi-

types of disabilities. How courts
treat applicants with one type of
impairment offers insight into
how they might treat applicants
with other types of impairments.
However, courts often treat applicants with the same disability
differently (as should bar exam-

iners), depending upon each applicant’s medical
evaluations and specific accommodation requests.

site to licensure. Because the court’s decision has

Visual Impairment

solid support in Title II of the ADA, there is no rea-

Consistent with the ADA, bar examiners should usu-

son to suspect that a different court might waive
passing the bar examination as a prerequisite for a
law school graduate to practice law.

14

FOR

REFUSED

ally accommodate an applicant who has a visual disability with extra time as well as with one or more of
the following: a reader, a scribe, tapes, examination

Similarly, state boards must avoid providing

in Braille or large print, word processing device, or

accommodations to applicants with disabilities that

extra breaks, as recommended by the applicant’s

may give them an unfair advantage. For example, if

physician(s) or expert(s).49 When an applicant with a

the essay section of a state’s bar examination is a

visual disability presents credible medical evidence

“speeded test,”—that is, if a positive correlation

in support of a specific accommodation, a state board

exists between time allotted and performance on that

of bar examiners should provide that accommodation.

THE BAR EXAMINER, FEBRUARY 2004

In D’Amico v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,50

in light of their disabilities, with no entitlement to

the New York board denied the request of an appli-

“preferred” accommodations that might compro-

cant who suffered from a severe visual impairment

mise the security of the bar examination. The United

and acute ocular fatigue that she be allowed to take

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed

the bar examination over four days instead of two,

with that finding, but ruled that the registrant’s

the accommodation recommended by her ophthal-

appeal was moot because he had already passed the

mologist. The court agreed with that recommenda-

MPRE without the requested accommodation before

tion, holding that in light of the applicant’s disabili-

the appeal was heard.

ty, the question of appropriate accommodation was a
“medical” issue and not a “testing” issue. The court
found that because the board failed to present any
medical evidence of its own, it should have acted on
the recommendation of the applicant’s physician.
On the other hand, bar

Chronic Diseases
As a corollary to the recommendation that bar examiners grant accommodation requests supported by
credible medical opinion, bar examiners are not
required to provide accommodations to applicants beyond those

examiners are not required to

ON

provide applicants with accom-

EXAMINERS ARE NOT REQUIRED

modations that might compro-

TO PROVIDE APPLICANTS WITH

mise bar examination security,

ACCOMMODATIONS THAT MIGHT

especially when such accommo-

Board of Bar Examiners,52 who suf-

COMPROMISE BAR EXAMINATION

dations are not requested out of

fered from multiple sclerosis,

SECURITY, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH

requested time and a half, a

ACCOMMODATIONS

legally trained scribe, and a

necessity. In Barr v. National
Conference of Bar Examiners,51
NCBE refused a blind regis-

THE

OTHER

HAND,

ARE

BAR

NOT

REQUESTED OUT OF NECESSITY.

trant’s request to use a computer
equipped with a voice synthesizer capable of reading
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE) questions from a computer diskette. NCBE
cited security concerns arising from the potential
copying of the diskette. (Although not mentioned in
the case, we understand that the applicant’s request
for accommodations extended to the MBE.) Instead,
NCBE offered the registrant a range of alternative
accommodations from which to choose, including a
qualified reader, a taped text, and a Braille version of
the examination. The registrant filed a lawsuit under
the ADA, but the federal district court ruled in favor
of NCBE, stating that applicants with disabilities
enjoy only the right to “reasonable” accommodations

recommended by the applicant’s
physician(s) or expert(s). The
applicant in Ware v. Wyoming

change

of

venue

for

the

Wyoming bar examination. The
board gave her extra time as recommended by her physician, but not the full time
and a half as requested; the board also offered her a
scribe to transcribe her examination answers and an
additional restroom break. Rather than take the
examination with those accommodations, the applicant filed suit against the board in federal court,
seeking damages and an injunction enjoining the
board from denying her time and venue requests.
The court denied the applicant’s claim, finding that
the accommodations offered by the Wyoming board
were “reasonable" under the ADA. The decision in
Ware stands as another example of a court deferring
to a medical recommendation submitted on behalf of

TESTING APPLICANTS WITH DISABILITIES
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an applicant, but in that case, the court’s deference

of the sittings of the New York bar examination, she

resulted in the applicant not receiving her requested

requested accommodations for her reading disabili-

accommodations.

ty, commonly referred to as dyslexia.55 The New York
Board of Law Examiners denied each timely request

Learning Disabilities
Even though learning and other mental disabilities
are explicitly covered in United States Department of
Justice regulations promulgated under the ADA,53 no
firm criteria currently exist for diagnosing applicants
with the same accuracy as the criteria for diagnosing
applicants with physical disabilities. Rather than arising out of
any scientific consensus, many

that she submitted, maintaining (as advised by its
expert) that she did not have a “disability” because
she scored above the 30th percentile on two standardized reading tests. On her fifth attempt at taking
the New York bar examination, the board provided
her time and a half to take the New York part of the
examination (she elected to take

THE

LANDMARK BAR EXAMINA-

well as use of an amanuensis to

definitions of learning disabili-

TION TESTING ACCOMMODATIONS

ties in current use are arbitrary

CASE ON LEARNING DISABILITIES

because of the practical necessity

THAT PRODUCED FIVE SEPARATE

of labeling students in instruc-

OPINIONS,

tional settings to accommodate

YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS, ILLUSTRATES THE

in the test booklet. Bartlett and

DIFFICULTIES THAT BAR EXAMIN-

that even if she passed the exam-

ERS ENCOUNTER IN DETERMINING

ination with those accommoda-

their needs or provide special
programming.54 When confronted with applicant accommodation requests for learning disabilities, bar examiners must

BARTLETT

V.

NEW

WHETHER AN APPLICANT HAS A

first decide whether the learning

LEARNING “DISABILITY” PROTECT-

impairment in question is pro-

ED BY THE

ADA.

examiners can then make decisions as to what constitutes “reasonable accommodations” for that
impairment.
The landmark bar examination testing accommodations case on learning disabilities that produced
five separate opinions, Bartlett v. New York State Board
of Law Examiners, illustrates the difficulties that bar
examiners encounter in determining whether an
applicant has a learning “disability” protected by the
ADA. Marilyn Bartlett had taken and failed the New
York bar examination four times, and took and failed
the Pennsylvania bar examination once. Before some
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read the test questions to her and
record her responses, and permission to mark her answers to
multiple choice questions directly
the New York board stipulated

tions, she would be certified for
admission to the New York bar
only upon prevailing in her
lawsuit that she had initiated in

tected by the ADA; if so, bar
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the MBE in Pennsylvania), as

federal court against the New
York board. However, she failed the New York bar
examination for the fifth time even with those
accommodations.
After a 21-day trial, the federal district court56
concluded that Bartlett’s reading rate compared
unfavorably with “persons of comparable training,
skills and ability.” From the court’s viewpoint, her
reading impairment “substantially limited” her
capabilities in the “major life activity” of working
because it prevented her from competing fairly on
the bar examination and securing employment in
law—her chosen field. Consequently, the court held

that Bartlett had a reading “disability,” and that she

substantially limited in the major life activity of read-

was entitled to double time over four days, the use of

ing”; and (ii) “whether it [was] Bartlett’s impairment,

a computer, permission to circle multiple choice

rather than factors such as her education, experience

answers in her test booklet, and an examination in

or innate ability that ‘substantially limit[ed]’ her abil-

large print if she chose to take the New York bar

ity to work.”59 The district court60 did an about-face in

examination a sixth time.

reasoning without changing its conclusion. After

The district court did not find that Bartlett’s
reading impairment “substantially limited” her in
the “major life activity” of reading when compared
with the average person in the general population, as
did the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit when it heard the case on appeal.57
The appellate court criticized the board’s arbitrariness in applying “bright-line tests” (the two stan-

considering additional testimony, the court ruled
that Bartlett was “disabled” in the “major life activity” of reading as compared to the average person in
the general population. In reaching that conclusion,
the district court focused on the qualitative rather
than the quantitative effect that her impairment had
on her reading and learning skills. Furthermore, the
court once again found that Bartlett had a “disability”
that “substantially limited” her

dardized reading tests) to determine that Bartlett’s disability

BASED

did not interfere with her “major

EXPERTS NOW MUST ANALYZE

life activity” of reading. The

AND REACT TO SUBJECTIVE MED-

appellate court refused to defer
to the board’s learning disabilities expert in an area outside of
the board’s expertise, which was
testing, and found that Bartlett’s
disability

did

ON

BARTLETT,

A BOARD’S

in the “major life activity” of
working. The court ordered the
New York board to provide
Bartlett with the accommoda-

ICAL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

tions that she had originally

BY OTHER CLINICIANS AND NOT

requested if she chose to retake

MERELY RELY ON OBJECTIVE TEST

the New York bar examination.

RESULTS.

“substantially

At least in its second decision, the district court expressed

limit” her reading. Despite the fact that the two

its preference for the subjective and qualitative

courts focused on different life activities, the out-

observations of Bartlett’s experts to the objective

come of both Bartlett I and Bartlett II were the same:

bright-line measures emphasized by the New York

Bartlett had a “disability” and was entitled to her

board. The court thus effectively precluded New

requested accommodations.

York bar examiners from articulating and applying

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the appellate court
because the Second Circuit had not considered
Bartlett’s ability to self-accommodate (as required by
the recently decided Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. and
its companion cases).58 In turn, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked the
district court on remand whether (i) “Bartlett [was]

objective tests for diagnosing learning disabilities, a
position that courts in other jurisdictions are likely to
follow. In the absence of litigation, applicants with
disabilities are rarely evaluated by board-appointed
experts. Based on Bartlett, a board’s experts now
must analyze and react to subjective medical evaluations conducted by other clinicians and not merely
rely on objective test results. Such a ruling serves to
increase uncertainty among bar examiners regarding

TESTING APPLICANTS WITH DISABILITIES
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whether applicants have “disabilities,” resulting in

Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of

increased costs and risks. Once again, we find courts

Massachusetts, after an administrative hearing, held

deferring to credible medical opinions offered by an

that the appropriate accommodation for an applicant

applicant’s physician(s) or expert(s).

with a learning disability was double time, and not

61

By contrast, bar examiners have no obligation to
defer to clinical evaluations they do not find credible.

the extra thirty minutes per examination section that
the Massachusetts board had offered.

In Haddon v. Montana Board of Bar Examiners,62 the

NCBE recommends time and a half as the pre-

Montana Supreme Court refused to order the board

sumptive accommodation for applicants with docu-

to provide the accommodations recommended by

mented learning disabilities, double time for appli-

the applicant’s psychologist. The court criticized the

cants who have histories of severe impairments, and

applicant’s psychologist for describing his client’s

a case-by-case determination for applicants with
newly diagnosed disabilities.64 In

“cognitive handicap” (in a letter
to the Montana board) without
providing evidence in support of
his diagnosis of the applicant’s
“learning disability.” The court

BAR

EXAMINERS HAVE NARROW

WINDOWS FOR ERROR; IF THEY
GIVE APPLICANTS WITH DISABILI-

Court criticized its state board of
bar examiners for giving an
applicant with a learning disabil-

found that (i) the psychologist’s

TIES TOO MUCH TIME, THEY COM-

letter was not credible because it

PROMISE TEST VALIDITY, BUT IF

recommended by NCBE.65 But,

took the form of a legal argu-

THEY PROVIDE TOO LITTLE TIME,

while NCBE recommendations

ment; and (ii) any applicant with

THEY EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO LIT-

are a useful starting point, the

the plaintiff’s claimed limitations (i.e., difficulties with “con-

IGATION.

cept formation, problem solving,

ity less than the amount of time

ADA requires that bar examiners
consider the needs of all applicants on a case-by-case basis.

strategy generation and hypothesis testing”) would

The difficulty remains for bar examiners in how to

have trouble passing the bar examination even in the

respond appropriately to applicants with various

absence of any “disability.”

disabilities while still preserving the validity of test

Because most applicants with learning disabilities ask for extra time, the question arises as to how
much extra time they should be given—another
issue that the courts have yet to respond to with any
consistency. Bar examiners have narrow windows
for error; if they give applicants with disabilities too
much time, they compromise test validity, but if they
provide too little time, they expose themselves to litigation. Further, bar examiners will often be secondguessed by courts. In Weintraub v. Massachusetts
Board of Bar Examiners (a non-ADA case),63 the
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one case, the Delaware Supreme
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scores for all applicants.66 Perhaps the best standard
for bar examiners (at least in cases where applicants
have well-documented learning disabilities) is to
align bar examination accommodations with accommodations previously afforded to the applicant in
instructional settings—for instance, in law school,
and on standardized tests—for example, on the Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT).67
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
ADHD, of which there are three subtypes (the most
well-known of which is attention deficit disorder, or

ADD), is a neurobiological disorder that produces

of an impairment that extends beyond an applicant’s

inattentiveness (e.g., poor organization, lack of atten-

difficulty with taking tests.72 However, like the

tion to detail, easy distraction by external stimuli),

judges in the Bartlett cases, Ranseen is skeptical of

impulsiveness (e.g., not waiting one’s turn, inter-

experts who rely on objective cognitive tests as the

rupting others), and hyperactivity (e.g., fidgeting,

sole indicator in ADHD evaluations. For applicants

talking excessively).

Listed in the Diagnostic and

whose ADHD was not diagnosed in childhood, bar

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) as

examiners should insist that a comprehensive clini-

a psychiatric disorder, ADHD qualifies as a “mental

cal report (which includes an exhaustive review of

impairment” under the ADA. ADHD is difficult to

the applicant’s educational background and psycho-

diagnose because, even though it is not a learning

logical testing results) accompany any ADHD-relat-

disability, it has similar manifestations, and individ-

ed accommodation request.73

68

uals with ADHD tend to suffer from learning disabilities as well.69 Furthermore, individuals without
disabilities can exhibit inattention, hyperactivity, and
impulsiveness (although not as
consistently

as

those

with

ADHD), as can individuals who
suffer from a variety of other

The critical question for bar examiners is
whether an applicant with ADHD is “substantially
limited” in the “major life activity” of learning. In
Price v. National Board of Medical

ONE

OF THE MOST IMPORTANT

Examiners,74 a West Virginia fed-

AND EXPENSIVE CHALLENGES FOR

eral district court, in comparing

psychiatric disorders.70 With an

BAR EXAMINERS IS EVALUATING

increasing number of ADHD-

THE BROAD RANGE OF MEDICAL

related accommodation requests

DOCUMENTS THAT BAR EXAMINA-

coming from bar examination

TION APPLICANTS SUBMIT WITH

applicants in recent years, bar

THEIR

examiners face tasks in determining

whether

individual

ADHD-RELATED
71
MODATION REQUESTS.

applicants in fact deserve ADA
protection for ADHD. One of the most important and
expensive challenges for bar examiners is evaluating
the broad range of medical documents that bar
examination applicants submit with their ADHDrelated accommodation requests.71

ACCOM-

medical students with ADHD to
average persons in the general
population, found that certain
U.S. Medical Licensing Examination applicants were not “disabled” because they could learn
as well as the average person. The
court found that while the appli-

cants’ impairments affected their abilities to learn,
their superior intellectual capabilities and past academic performance negated any claim that their
learning was “substantially limit[ed].” Accordingly,
bar examiners who review ADHD evaluations submitted by bar examination applicants must find evi-

Dr. John Ranseen, an ADHD expert who has con-

dence that goes beyond an applicant’s difficulties in

sulted with bar examiners on ADHD-related accom-

law school or in taking tests with time limitations.

modation requests, suggests that bar examiners look

Those applicants suffering from an ADHD “disabili-

at evaluations submitted by applicants who claim

ty,” as opposed to solely an ADHD “impairment” are

they have ADHD for the following: (i) objective evi-

more likely to have histories reflecting significant

dence of a developmental history of ADHD, because

academic, employment and interpersonal relation-

ADHD usually begins in childhood; and (ii) evidence

ship problems.75
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Once bar examiners decide that an applicant’s

legislative history of the ADA directs courts to the

ADHD is a “disability,” Dr. Ranseen recommends

DSM-IV as the authoritative source regarding which

that they look for reasonable evidence that the

disorders qualify as “mental impairments.”81 While

requested accommodations are intended to “amelio-

the DSM-IV has no definition for test anxiety, at least

rate [the] disability . . . [and] not simply to provide

one expert has classified it within the DSM-IV cate-

hope of improved test performance.” One common

gory of “social phobia,”82 which would qualify it as a

myth is that all individuals with ADHD require sep-

“mental impairment” under the ADA. The lack of

arate testing rooms in order to minimize distrac-

federal case law on test anxiety precludes certainty

tions; further, as with learning disabilities, no evi-

as to whether courts would agree with that classifi-

dence exists showing that extra time does anything

cation, or whether courts would even consider test

more than give applicants with ADHD an unfair

anxiety “a mental impairment” at all.

76

77

advantage that affects test validity. With an increase
78

in the number of clinicians acting as advocates for
bar examination applicants diagnosed with ADHD,
bar examiners must require documentation that
clearly shows the extent of an applicant’s past difficulty with test taking, as well as past accommodations provided to the applicant in instructional settings.79
Test Anxiety
While it has no uniform definition, one expert has
defined test anxiety as a combination of subjective
distress (e.g., fear, apprehension), physical symptoms (e.g., trembling, sweating, clammy hands, voice
tremors, muscular tension, increased heart rate), negative thoughts (e.g., “I cannot pass this test,” “I am a
failure”), and cognitive impairment (e.g., the anxiety
causes a test taker’s mind to go blank).80 Bar examination applicants seeking accommodations for test
anxiety present at least two challenges for bar examiners: (i) to determine whether those applicants have
“mental impairments” as defined by the ADA; and
(ii) if so, to evaluate whether the impairments “substantially limit[] one or more [of the applicant’s]
major life activities.”
The ADA and the regulations promulgated
thereunder contain no reference to test anxiety. The

20
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Even if test anxiety is an “impairment,” bar
examination applicants seeking accommodations
face a much more difficult task in proving that the
impairment “substantially limits one or more major
life activities.” They have two possible arguments: (i)
test anxiety interferes with the “major life activity” of
thinking; and (ii) test anxiety interferes with the
“major life activity” of working.83 The problem with
the first argument is that courts will not likely rule
that an applicant’s test anxiety “substantially limits”
his or her thinking, when by definition it limits
thinking only in the context of test taking.84
Regarding the second argument, bar examination
applicants might claim that test anxiety “substantially limits” them in the “major life activity” of working
because it prevents them from passing the bar examination, and therefore from practicing their chosen
profession.85 However, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that an “impairment” does not “substantially limit” an individual’s ability to work when
it excludes the individual from only “one type of job,
a specialized job or a job of choice.”86 Thus, it is
doubtful that a court would accept a bar examination
applicant’s argument that he or she is disabled
because test anxiety precludes him or her from practicing law, especially in light of the narrow definition

of “disability” articulated by the United States

and those with documented histories of test anxiety.

Supreme Court.

For the latter group, it is likely that bar examiners

At least one court has ruled that test anxiety is
not a “disability” under the ADA. In McGuinness v.
University of New Mexico School of Medicine,87 a medical student wanted accommodations for his chemistry and mathematics examinations because of the
level of anxiety he had experienced during previous
exams in those subject areas. The medical school
refused to accommodate him and the federal appellate court agreed, ruling that the student did not

need only offer accommodations when the test anxiety
affects the applicants in aspects of their lives outside
of the examination room.

PART 3: ADA LITIGATION ISSUES
A major challenge for bar examiners and applicants
who litigate ADA-related claims is untangling the
current web of unresolved constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural issues that arise in such litigation. The most important of these

have a “disability.” The court

WITH

ety did not “substantially limit

HAVE YET TO DECIDE WHETHER

Procedural Due Process

BAR EXAMINATION APPLICANTS

With one exception, courts have

WITH DISABILITIES HAVE A CON-

yet to decide whether bar exami-

STITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HEARINGS

nation applicants with disabili-

one or more of his major life
activities” because he had already earned a bachelor’s degree in chemistry and physics, a

ONE EXCEPTION, COURTS

issues are discussed below.

reasoned that the student’s anxi-

degree in physiological psychol-

BEFORE STATE BOARDS OF BAR

ogy, and a doctorate in clinical

EXAMINERS

psychology, and he had work

REQUESTS FOR TESTING ACCOM-

experience as a practicing clini-

MODATIONS.

REFUSE

89

cal psychologist.

THEIR

ties have a constitutional right to
hearings before state boards of
bar

examiners

refuse

their

requests for testing accommodations.89 The lone exception is the
Delaware Supreme Court, which

With the U.S. Supreme Court restricting the

considered the issue outside the context of the ADA.

scope of the ADA, bar examiners appear to have

In In re Petition of Thomas E. Cahill,90 that court found

increasing justification for not granting accommoda-

that the Delaware Board of Bar Examiners had vio-

tions to applicants whose text anxiety symptoms do

lated an applicant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to

not interfere with aspects of their lives outside of

procedural due process when it denied his request

testing. However, if applicants with text anxiety

for “special accommodations” without granting him

request separate rooms for taking the bar examina-

a hearing. Despite acknowledging that the board had

tion (which alleviates test anxiety for many appli-

consulted its own expert who concluded that the

cants),88 bar examiners can grant such accommoda-

applicant did not have a disability, the court ruled

tions with minimal cost and without much threat to

that the applicant had a right to a hearing as to the

test score validity. But, if those same applicants

factual issue of whether he, in fact, was disabled. At

request extra time, bar examiners must make diffi-

least in part, the court based its decision on existing

cult distinctions between those individuals who are

board rules giving applicants the right to a hearing

simply anxious about taking the bar examination

to resolve factual disputes regarding character and
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fitness, and a right to a hearing to request a discre-

In certain states, such as New Jersey, the state

tionary fifth opportunity to take the Delaware bar

supreme court has delegated all administrative

examination. After the decision in Cahill, the

authority for bar examinations to the state board of

Delaware Board of Bar Examiners promulgated Rule

bar examiners; therefore, in New Jersey and other

29

such states, boards do not allow appeals arising from

91

establishing procedural due process for appli-

cants with disabilities who seek testing accommoda-

their

tions. Board Rule 29 refers to an older rule (Rule 15,

Applicants in those states have no choice but to file

regarding “special accommodations”) in stating that

their claims in federal district court, despite the limi-

“[i]f an application has not been approved by the

tations that Eleventh Amendment immunity places

Board because there exists disputed issues of fact

on recovery.

with regard to the subject matter of . . . Board of Bar
Examiners . . . Rule 15 . . . the applicant may petition
the Board for a hearing.”

on

testing

accommodations.95

However, a federal district court might invoke
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to refuse consideration
of an applicant’s claim, even though some federal

Regardless of whether the ADA requires hearings

courts, despite the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, have

in connection with denials of testing accommodations,

afforded injunctive relief to applicants seeking

it is likely that the due process clause of the

reasonable accommodations under the ADA.96 The

Fourteenth Amendment requires bar examiners to

Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose from the decisions in

consider requests for accommodations on a case-by-

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.97 and D.C. Court of Appeals

case basis. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the

v. Feldman.98 In Rooker, the United States Supreme

U.S. Department of Justice issued an administrative

Court recognized that federal district court jurisdic-

civil rights opinion regarding the Hawaii Board of

tion is original, and therefore lower federal courts

92

Education’s policy for special education students.

could not hear appeals of final decisions by state

The Department noted that the due process clause

supreme courts. In Feldman, the Court held that deci-

requires educators to evaluate disabilities on a case-

sions by the D.C. Court of Appeals (the highest court

by-case basis because the needs of special education

in the District of Columbia) regarding bar admis-

students vary, even among students suffering from

sions constituted final judicial decisions and as such,

the same disability. There is little reason to doubt

could be reviewed only by the United States

that bar examiners must do the same under the ADA

Supreme Court and not by federal district or inter-

because the ADA rejects categorization of persons by

mediate appellate courts. In so deciding, the Court

“disability” in favor of considering the unique needs

extended its previous ruling in Rooker to the District

of each individual.

of Columbia, even though it is not a state. Those two

93

94

Federal and State Court Jurisdiction

decisions preclude any federal court (apart from the
United States Supreme Court) from reviewing the

No universal answer exists regarding whether appli-

final decisions of state courts, even when those deci-

cants with disabilities should litigate claims related

sions raise federal issues.

to testing accommodations in state or federal court, as
the answer largely depends on the jurisdiction in which
the applicant applies to sit for the bar examination.

22
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There is reason to think that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply to litigation initiated by bar

examination applicants in states like New Jersey,
where full authority for bar admissions is delegated
to state boards. First, the doctrine applies only to
final decisions made by state supreme courts, and
the decisions of bar examiners to deny testing
accommodations are always made before applicants
take the bar examination and before state supreme
courts either certify or do not certify applicants for
admission to the state bar.99 Second, the doctrine bars
appeals only from judicial decisions; the denial of
testing accommodations is most likely administrative rather than judicial because bar examiners do
not hold hearings before making such decisions,
unlike hearings before an adverse character and fitness review.

100

Last, a board’s adverse decision on

testing accommodations does not, in and of itself,
deny an applicant a substantive right (i.e., the right
to practice law). Just as the New York and Wyoming
federal courts exercised jurisdiction over applicants’
claims related to the denial of testing accommodations,101 it is likely that a federal district court would
exercise jurisdiction over any similar claim by a bar
examination applicant.
However, in many other states, such as
Delaware, applicants have the right to appeal
adverse decisions on testing accommodations to the
state supreme court after taking and failing the bar
examination. In such states, applicants probably cannot seek relief in federal court after exhausting their
state law remedies, which they must do under federal law.102 Once such an applicant has a hearing and
subjects him or herself to a state supreme court ruling, an effort to obtain relief in federal court would
trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and bar federal
court jurisdiction. In those jurisdictions, the applicant’s only federal avenue of appeal would be to the
United States Supreme Court on a petition of certiorari.

State Immunity
The question of whether bar examination applicants
may recover monetary damages in ADA lawsuits
brought against state boards of bar examiners in federal court has not been resolved. The Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution renders states and state officers who act in their official
capacities immune from suits for monetary damages
initiated by private individuals in federal court.103
However, Congress is empowered to abrogate that
immunity under Section V of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy a pattern of irrational state
discrimination.104 In Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett,105 the United States Supreme
Court found that Congress lacked the authority to
abrogate state immunity under Title I (employment)
of the ADA. The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment precluded state employees from suing
non-consenting states in federal court for monetary
damages under Title I. However, the Court explicitly
limited its holding in Garrett to suits for monetary
damages against state employers, and noted that
employees could still seek injunctive relief against
state officials in federal court.
It is possible that the United States Supreme
Court will decide whether the Eleventh Amendment
immunizes state entities (including boards of bar
examiners) from suit under Title II of the ADA. The
Court granted certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to consider the issue in
Medical Board of California v. Hason,106 but then dismissed the case. The Court may find that Congress
did not have the authority to enact Title II because it
failed to show a pattern of state discrimination
against persons with disabilities in the provision of
public services. Regardless of whether and how the
Court decides that issue, bar examination applicants
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with disabilities would still be able to seek injunctive

finding that the applicant would not suffer irrepara-

relief against individual bar examiners under Title II

ble harm if his request for testing accommodations

of the ADA, and possibly be able to seek monetary

were rejected. Similarly, in Christian v. New York State

damages and injunctive relief against state boards

Board of Law Examiners,110 another New York federal

under Title III.

district court found that a delay in a bar examination
applicant’s legal career that could result from the

Injunctive Relief

applicant not receiving reasonable accommodations

Bar examination applicants with disabilities who are

and failing the New York bar examination once was

denied testing accommodations might, however,

insufficient proof of irreparable harm, and that any

face obstacles in obtaining injunctive relief.

harm could be remedied with monetary relief. The

Applicants who litigate under the ADA often seek

court failed to note that the applicant might not be

preliminary injunctions enjoining state boards from

able to recover monetary damages if the Garrett

denying them certain “reasonable accommodations”

rationale were to apply to Title II of the ADA.

on the subsequent administration of the bar examination. But even when applicants with disabilities

Attorneys’ Fees

present meritorious substantive claims under the

The ADA contains a provision that allows the “pre-

ADA (a likelihood of success on the merits), they

vailing party” in ADA-related litigation to recover

must show that irreparable harm would result if an

attorneys’ fees from the losing party.111 In Buckhannon

injunction were not granted.107 If

Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West

an applicant with a disability has

HOWEVER,

FEDERAL

Virginia Department of Health and

yet to sit for the bar examination

LAW ON TESTING ACCOMMODA-

Human Resources,112 the United

at the time of seeking injunctive
relief, a court could find that no
irreparable harm would occur if
the applicant failed the bar
examination on the first try,

108

BECAUSE

TIONS IS IN A STATE OF FLUX, BAR
EXAMINERS SHOULD KEEP ABREAST
OF

NEW

DEVELOPMENTS

ADA-RELATED LITIGATION.

and consequently postpone any

the “catalyst theory” adopted by
many lower courts, under which
a plaintiff in an ADA-related
lawsuit could recover attorneys’
fees even if the case settled pre-

decision on injunctive relief until after the applicant

judgment, as long as the plaintiff had induced a vol-

has taken the examination without the requested

untary change in the defendant’s conduct.113 The

accommodations. If the applicant passes, the issue is

Court limited the circumstances under which a pre-

moot; if the applicant fails, the court can issue an

vailing plaintiff could recover fees to those in which

injunction in anticipation of the next administration

the plaintiff had secured a judgment or favorable

of the bar examination.

court-sanctioned consent decree.114 Because of

Two federal district court decisions illustrate
those obstacles. In Pazer v. New York State Board of
Law Examiners,109 a New York federal district court
considered an applicant’s position as a first-year
associate in a Manhattan law firm as one factor in its

24

IN

States Supreme Court rejected

THE BAR EXAMINER, FEBRUARY 2004

Buckhannon, bar examiners have greater incentive to
settle applicants’ ADA claims because they no longer
run the risk of a court ordering them to pay the
applicant’s attorneys’ fees after a settlement.115

administration dates. Examiners need

Statute of Limitations
At least one federal circuit court has suggested that
the statute of limitations in testing accommodations
cases tolls at the occurrence of the discriminatory act
(the denial of testing accommodations), and not
when the applicant fails the examination. In Soignier
v. American Board of Plastic Surgery,116 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the limitations period for the applicant’s cause

sufficient time to review requests, consult
with outside medical experts, and ask
applicants for supplemental information
or documentation if necessary. Likewise,
bar examiners should notify applicants
of adverse decisions early enough to
accommodate appeals prior to test
administration dates.

of action arising under the ADA began to toll when

3. Boards of bar examiners should provide

the American Board of Plastic Surgery denied his

applicants with detailed descriptions of

request for accommodations on the oral plastic surgery

all information and documentation re-

exam and not when he failed the exam.117

quired to support their accommodation

PART 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BAR
EXAMINERS

requests. It is in the interest of boards to
be as specific as possible regarding what
they require in the way of medical evalu-

The following recommendations will help bar exam-

ations and medical histories for different

iners comply with the ADA. However, because federal

disabilities, especially as to mental dis-

law on testing accommodations is in a state of flux,

abilities, which are harder to diagnose

bar examiners should keep abreast of new develop-

and document than physical disabilities.

ments in ADA-related litigation.

Boards should not hesitate to seek sup-

1. Individual boards should make their

plemental information or documentation

ADA testing accommodation policies

from applicants whose initial submis-

available to all applicants in written

sions are inadequate. It is against the

form. These policies should state proce-

interests of bar examiners to leave deci-

dures for applicants with disabilities to

sions regarding documentation to the

follow when making their accommoda-

discretion of individual applicants.

tion requests, the standards used to eval-

Specific requirements will allow boards

uate those requests, and the appeal pro-

to defend more easily requests for sup-

cedure, should any of those requests be

plemental information from applicants,

denied. Ideally, bar examiners should

should legal challenges arise.

118

include hard copies of their policies in all
registration materials sent to applicants
and law schools, in addition to posting
the policies on their websites.

4. Boards should establish criteria to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a
“disability” exists and what are “reasonable” accommodations for that disability.

deadlines

Such criteria may include a list of pre-

should be set well in advance of test

sumptive accommodations for various

2. Accommodation

request
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disabilities. The criteria may be more

specific queries about serious mental illness that

detailed than the testing accommodation

could impact the applicant’s ability to practice law.

policies provided to applicants. However,
to withstand judicial scrutiny, bar examiners should not include objective brightline tests among their criteria.
5. If a board of bar examiners is inclined to
reject an applicant’s requested accommodations despite the presence of all
required medical information and documentation, it is imperative that the board
consult with an independent medical
expert to support its decision. The expert
should, at a minimum, review the applicant’s file, and if the board denies the
request(s), the expert should be prepared
to testify as to why the accommodations
recommended by the applicant’s physician(s) or expert(s) are medically “unreasonable.”

PART 5: CHARACTER AND FITNESS
The ADA also affects character and fitness investigations, though not to the same extent that it affects
testing accommodations. Most disabilities do not
trigger concerns about applicants’ character and fitness, and most concerns about applicants’ character
and fitness do not relate to disabilities. However, the
degree to which bar examiners can inquire into an
applicant’s mental health history has been heavily
litigated. In the 1990s, there were a number of challenges to character and fitness applications that
asked applicants about their mental health histories
despite that certain applicants had mental impairments that had no bearing on their fitness to practice
law. As a result of those successful challenges, boards
have largely limited their mental health questions to
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Jurisdiction
While applicants in most states who are denied testing accommodations have no right to an evidentiary
hearing or review by the state supreme court, applicants are generally entitled to both a hearing before
the state board’s character and fitness committee and
review by the state supreme court before they are
denied licensure because of unsuitable character and
fitness. Until applicants exhaust all appeals in the
state system, the federal courts will abstain. In
Edwards v. Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar,119 the
Illinois board denied a hearing to an applicant who
had received treatment for major depression because
she refused to sign a blanket medical release authorizing access to her mental health records. Although
the Illinois board eventually offered her a hearing
despite the fact that she did not sign the release, the
Illinois federal district court to which she applied for
relief refused to intervene and dictate the extent to
which bar examiners could consider the applicant’s
mental health records. The court abstained, noting
that the applicant could only exercise her right of
review before the state supreme court.
The federal district court in that case found that
the abstention doctrine applies when: (i) there is a
pending state proceeding; (ii) a compelling state
interest is at stake; and (iii) the complaining party
has the ability to raise his or her federal claims in a
state court hearing. The court abstained after finding
that: (i) state proceedings regarding attorney licensure are judicial in nature; (ii) the state has a compelling interest in assessing and ensuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses; and (iii)

the applicant has a right of review of her claim before
the state supreme court.

Mental Health Inquiries
Boards of bar examiners may ask applicants narrow-

However, applicants must also contend with the

ly tailored questions about their mental health histo-

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts,

ries as long as those questions are related to the

except the United States Supreme Court, from

applicants’ fitness to practice law. For example, in

reviewing character and fitness decisions rendered

Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Examiners,123 the

after board hearings and state supreme court review.

Texas federal district court found that the state

In Campbell v. Greisberger,

the state board and state

board’s character and fitness question to applicants

supreme court rejected the character and fitness

about adolescent or adult histories of “bipolar disor-

application of an applicant with schizophrenia, but

der, schizophrenia, paranoia, and psychotic disor-

the applicant was told that he could reapply for

ders” did not run afoul of the ADA. The court

admission to the state bar if he could present new

approved the state board’s practice of further inves-

evidence of his fitness to practice law. The United

tigating the mental health histories of applicants who

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled

had such “serious mental illnesses” because those ill-

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the federal

nesses could affect applicants’ fitness to practice law.

district court from reviewing decisions of the state

The court distinguished the Texas board’s practice

character and fitness committee and supreme court

from those involving questions that asked applicants

that related only to an individual applicant.

about their mental health histories regardless of

120

The court in Campbell, however, noted that federal district courts did have jurisdiction over general

what mental illness they had and during what time
frame.

challenges to character and fitness application ques-

Two decisions from a Virginia federal district

tions or procedures related to all applicants. For

court illustrate the limits on character and fitness

example, in Ellen S. v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners,121

inquiries into applicants’ mental health histories. In

the federal court struck down the Florida board’s

Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,124 the court

character and fitness question about mental health

struck down as overbroad a question that asked,

history as overbroad, exercising jurisdiction over the

“Have you[,] within the past five (5) years, been

case because the applicant was making a general

treated or counseled for a mental, emotional or nerv-

challenge to a question directed at all applicants

ous disorder[s]?” An affirmative response necessitat-

rather than asking for review of her individual case.

ed that the applicant answer an additional set of

Similarly, in Roe No. 2 v. Ogden,122 the United States

questions about his or her mental health history. The

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the

court found that the Virginia board, in its use of men-

lower federal court had jurisdiction over general

tal health questions similar to the types of questions

challenges to the Colorado board’s character and fit-

asked in eighteen states, discriminated against appli-

ness questions about past treatment for drug, alco-

cants with mental illness by singling them out on the

hol, and narcotic use, and mental illness—all of

basis of their illnesses instead of evaluating them on

which triggered the submission of additional infor-

the basis of characteristics that could affect their fit-

mation if they were answered affirmatively.

ness to practice law.
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After Clark, the Virginia board rewrote the question to read:
Within the past five years, have you been
diagnosed with or have you been treated for
any of the following: schizophrenia or any
other psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, bipolar or manic depressive mood disorder, major depression, antisocial personality
disorder, or any other condition which significantly impaired your behavior, judgment,
understanding, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to function in school, work or other
important life activities?

dean had given the applicant a bad or qualified
recommendation due to his disability or his complaints about the law school’s disability policies. The
applicant filed his case only after the Illinois board
had required the applicant to interview with the
state’s character and fitness committee, the committee had deemed him fit to practice law, and he was
admitted to practice law in Illinois. The Illinois board
did what other boards should do in similar situations: make an independent determination as to an
applicant’s fitness to practice law rather than risk
relying strictly on outside assessments that could be
influenced by the applicant’s disability.

In O’Brien v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,125 the

CONCLUSION

court refused to enjoin the Virginia board from ask-

The ADA has presented bar examiners with new

ing the revised question and seeking a release of

challenges in providing appropriate testing accom-

medical records from applicants who answered the

modations for bar examination applicants with dis-

question affirmatively. The court found that the

abilities. Whether an applicant has a disability, and,

revised question was “carefully tailored to respect

if so, what reasonable accommodations should be

the privacy rights of the individual applicant.” The

afforded the applicant, are complex, novel, fact-spe-

court concluded that the plaintiff was not likely to

cific inquiries that bar examiners need to consider

succeed on the merits of his case because the Virginia

within the infrastructure of the ADA and the regula-

question and release sought only medical records rel-

tions promulgated thereunder. The recommenda-

evant to the applicant’s fitness to practice law.

tions provided in this article will hopefully assist bar

Independent Determination
In Rothman v. Emory University,126 an applicant with a

examiners and bar administrators in complying with
the ADA and avoiding ADA-related litigation.

seizure disorder brought an action against the uni-
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